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OF DAMAGES.'

Among the interesting questions which are daily arising in our
courts of law we may certainly rank those which relate to the measure of damages awarded to the successful party in an action. These
questions do not rest, nor therefore can they be argued, upon arbitrary or technical grounds, but only upon considerations of natural
justice between man and man. The problem to be solved is the
exact appoitionment of redress for a given injury- a problem that
has engaged. the attention of moral ihilosophers, as well as of legislators and.judges.. Nice discrimination, and a steady hand to hold
the balance, are often required for the purpose of accurately determining the amount of compensation. Varying, and dependent on the
policy, climate, or condition of a people, has been the principle of
assessment: sometimes the lex talionis has prevailed, " an eye for an
eye, and a tooth for a tooth ;" at other times a weregild, or money
commutation, even for-the life of a man. In a more practical point
of view, it is a matter of importance for those who have suffered wrong
to know with what measure compensation will be meted out to themwhether justice will open her hand liberally, or like a niggard.
There are some verdicts, like the Highlander's horse "hard to
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catch, and not worth the catching ;" and it is well to avoid the perilous pursuit, which, if successful, can only lead to such a result.
An important judgmient upon this branch of our law has lately
been delivered in the Court of Exchequer,' and a principle is there
laid down which is capable of extensive application, and of settling
many questions which hitherto have been left in uncertainty. The
facts were briefly these :-The plaintiffs were the owners of a large
flour-mill at Gloucester, which was worked by a steam-engine, the
shaft of which having been broken, they, on the 14th May, 1852,
delivered it to the defendants (more generally known by the namg
of Pickford & Co.) to take to Greenwich, where it was to serve as a
model for the making of a new shaft A delay of 'six days beyond
the time that was reasonably required for the carriage of the broken
shaft took plaue, and in consequence a corresponding delay took
place in the completion and transmission of the new shaft. It appeared that the shaft was an essential part of the machinery, and
that, until the new shaft was supplied, all the hands about the mill
were unemployed, and all the profits derived from.the working of the
mill were lost. 'The learned judge who presided told the jury that
the plaintiffs were entitled to recover for the damage which they had
sustained by reason of the stoppage of the mill for six days, and the
jury gave 251. damages, in addition to 251. paid into court. This
ruling was held to be wrong, and a new trial was granted. The court,
in delivering their considered judgment, said that the true principle
upon which damages should be assessed for a breach of contract is,
that the damages should be such as either result naturallyfrom the
breach, or may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties at the time of the entering into the contract.
"If there were special circumstances, and they were communicated
to the party who has broken the contract, then such special circumstances, being known, were in the contemplation of the parties, and
may be taken into consideration in assessing the damages.... Suppose there had been another shaft at the mill, the delay would have
had no effect or the profi*ts; or if othet machinery equally essential to
its being worked had been out of order, the same result would have
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happened.... It is obvious, that inthe generality of cases of a
miller sending a broken shaft, these consequences would not follow.
Here the special circumstances were not communicated, and were
entirely unknown to the defendants. We think," continued the
Court, "that the judge ought to have told the jury that they ought'
not to take the loss of profits into consideration." In the course of
the argument, Parke, B., referred, with approbation, to the rule of
the French law, Code Civil, liv. 3,tit. 3, s. 1150-" Le ddbiteur
n'est tenu que des dommages et intdr~ts, qui ont 6td prdvu ou qu'on
a pu pr~voir lors du contrat, lorsque ce n'est point exct6e." The
same doctrine prevails in the American law. Thus it is laid down,
in 2 Kent's Com. 480, note, (4th ed.)-" Damages for breaches of
contract are oily those which are incidental to and directly caused
by th e breach, and may reasonably be supposed to have entered into
the contemplation of the parties, and not speculative profits, or accidental or consequential losses."
It was also said by the Court that actions for not making out a'
good title to land contracted to be soldxand actions on bills of exchange and for non-payment of a specific sum of money, did not afford an exception to the above rule, but rather fell within the second
branch of it, as each party may be said to have contemplated, upon
entering into the contract, that in case the contract should be broken
the damages should be in accordance with the conventional rule,
which is well established, viz. in the first case, that the damages
should be limited to the expense of investigating the title, and should
not include the loss of the bargain; and in the second and third,
only the precise sums' agreed to be paid should be recovered.
The rule, as above laid down, doubtless tends to limit the liability of carriers and other contracting parties or bailees, in the absence
of express notice, and shows the necessity of giving such notice, if
the party who alone possesses the knowledge wishes to guard himself against loss. In numerous cases, as in the one under review,
the loss of profit, the payment of wages to unemployed workmen,
the liability on subsidiary contracts not performed because of the
principal contract being broken, would form the only damage; and
therefore, if these special circumstances be not communicated to the
other party, the one who suffers the actual injury has no redress.
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The shaft may have been essential to the machinery, the machinery
to the working of the mill, the working of the mill to the employment of the men, to the realization of profits, and to the performance
of other contracts; yet, for want of disclosing these facts, the shaft
becomes, in the eye of the law, so many hundred weight of old iron
-the delivery whereof may be delayed without any injury or loss 'naturally resulting from it.
The adoption of such"a principle cannot be said to be unreasonable. Here are two contracting parties-one possessing full knowledge, the other totally ignorant, of the special circumstances attending the contract, or, in other words, of the peculiar consequences
that will accrue from a breach. If the former does not place the
latter on an equal footing with himself in this respect, but induces
him to undertake an extraordinary charge at the ordinary rates of
risk, he has no right to complain if he is debarred from recovering
the amount of his loss. He had the opportunity of stimulating the
other party to the use of extra caution, and of' making him responsible for all the injury accruing from neglect on his part. The other
had a right to be forewarned, in order to be forearmed.
The'principal thus clearly laid down will affect and practically
overrule several previous decisions, in which the loss of profits, and
damages which have been paid for non-p6ribrmance of subsidiary
contracts, have been allowed as damages for breach of the principal
contract, although no notice has been brought home to the defaulting party (see, for ifnstance, TWalters vs. Towers, 8 Exch. 401);
but it will not probably touch the class of cases where the contract
may be said, from its very character, to involve notice of the natural consequences to be apprehended from a breach. Thus, in an
action for a breach of warranty of a chain cable, the plaintiff was
held entitled to recover the value of the anchor to which the cable
was attached, on proving, that a link of the cable was broken, the
crew slipped the cable in order to avoid danger, and thatthe anchor
and cable were thereby lost. (Borradaile vs. Brunton, 8 Taunt.
585). So, the" damages, will probably still be affected by matter
subsequent to the making of the -contract;. as if a man buy a horse
with a warranty, and, relying thereon, resell him with a Warranty,
and being sued on the warranty by his vendee, he'offers the'defence

